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THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AFTER SMITH II
Russell W. Galloway*
In Employment Division v. Smith' the Supreme Court modi-
fied the free exercise clause.2 This brief comment describes
the potential effect of Smith II on the structure of free exercise
clause analysis. The purpose is to supplement the author's
1989 article on the same subject.0
I. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE ANALYSIS BEFORE SMITH II
Before Employment Division v. Smith, the structure of free
exercise clause analysis seemed settled. If claimant satisfied the
preliminary requirements (jurisdiction, justiciability, and gov-
ernment action), the threshold question on the merits was
whether the government had imposed a cognizable disadvan-
tage on claimant because of claimant's religiously motivated
belief or conduct. However, the only burdens that triggered
free exercise scrutiny were government action that (1) penal-
ized belief or conduct prescribed by religion or (2) required
belief or conduct proscribed by religion.4
If these threshold demands were met, the government was
required to satisfy the free exercise clause. Coercion of reli-
gious belief was absolutely banned, but coercion of religious
conduct was subject to means-end scrutiny. In general, coer-
cion of religious conduct was subject to strict scrutiny; it violat-
ed the free exercise clause unless it was an effective and neces-
* Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia
University School of Law; Director, Supreme Court History Project; member of
the California bar.
1. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (Smith If). The case had reached the United States
Supreme Court before in Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (Smith
1).
2. The free exercise clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I, provides, "Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."
3. Galloway, Basic Free Exerise Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 865
(1989).
4. This article will use the phrase "coercion of religious belief or conduct"
as a shorthand to refer to these two types of government action.
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sary means to further a compelling government interest. In
contrast, coercion of religious conduct in prisons and the mili-
tary was subject to rationality review and violated the free exer-
cise clause only if it was not rationally related to a valid gov-
ernment interest.
II. THE SMITH CASE
Smith and his fellow claimant were discharged from jobs
as drug counselors because they used peyote in religious cere-
monies conducted by the Native American Church. Oregon
denied their unemployment compensation claims on the
ground that claimants had been discharged for misconduct.
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the free
exercise clause, as interpreted in Sherbert v. Verner,5 prohibits
the denial of benefits based on claimants' religiously pre-
scribed drug use. In Smith I,6 the United States Supreme
Court vacated and remanded for a determination whether
Oregon law exempts religiously motivated drug use from its
general criminal prohibition. On remand, the Oregon Su-
preme Court held that Oregon's criminal statute prohibiting
peyote use does not exempt religious ceremonies, but that
denial of unemployment benefits violates the free exercise
clause as construed in Sherbert. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari a second time.
In Smith 1I,' the Court held that the free exercise clause
does not prohibit Oregon from denying unemployment com-
pensation to claimants who were fired for drug use prohibited
by the Oregon criminal statute. Under prior precedents, the
denial of unemployment benefits would have been subject to
strict scrutiny, since it penalized conduct prescribed by
claimants' religion. But the Court did not apply strict scrutiny
in Smith I. Instead, it held that penalizing conduct prescribed
by claimants' religion does not even trigger free exercise clause
scrutiny where the conduct is prohibited by a valid state crimi-
nal law. As the Court put it, "Even if we were inclined to
5. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Sherbefl is the landmark case in which the Court
held for the first time that government coercion of religious conduct is subject to
strict scrutiny under the free exercise clause.
6. 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
7. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment com-
pensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions
from a generally applicable criminal law."8
In short, Smith II created a huge new exception to the free
exercise clause by holding that state sanctions on conduct re-
quired by religion but prohibited by a generally applicable
criminal statute are not subject to the clause at all.
The scope of the new exception is unclear. The major
question left open by Smith II is whether the exception also
applies to state sanctions on religiously prescribed conduct
where such sanctions are authorized by a generally applicable
civil (noncriminal) law. The Court's precedents in the unem-
ployment compensation field certainly suggest that, at least in
some cases, the answer is no. In its prior unemployment com-
pensation cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny even though
the denial of benefits was authorized by generally applicable
unemployment compensation laws providing that benefits
should be denied where claimant voluntarily quit or was dis-
charged for good cause.9 But Smith II shows that the current
Court is willing to change free exercise law substantially, so
those precedents may not be worth much. Moreover, the
Court may decide that some noncriminal rules (such as those
enforced by civil fines) should be treated like criminal prohibi-
tions, while others (such as those granting benefits) should not.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF SMITH II: THREE MODELS
OF FREE EXERCISE LAW
Smith II has, no doubt, dramatically unsettled free exercise
law,"° leaving it unclear whether the old model of free exer-
cise clause analysis is still valid and, if not, what the new model
will be. There seem to be at least three possibilities: (1) that,
8. Id. at 1603. The Court acknowledged that strict scrutiny would still apply
when the government singles out religious conduct for special burdens and in
"hybrid situations," id. at 1602, when the government coercion infringes not only
religious freedom but also some independent fundamental right.
9. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
10. "[T]oday's holding dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment
jurisprudence . . . ." Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment). "In short, it effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law con-
cerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution." Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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subject to the new Smith II exception, the old model is still
valid, (2) that a new two-track model of free exercise clause
analysis will emerge, or (3) that a new model will be used in
which rationality review is the general rule for government
coercion of religious conduct and strict scrutiny the exception.
A. Model 1. The Old Model with a New Exception
Perhaps the Court intends to retain the traditional model
of free exercise clause analysis. Under this model, government
coercion of religious belief is absolutely banned, while govern-
ment coercion of religious conduct is subject to strict scrutiny
unless it occurs in a prison or military context." This model
is sufficient to accommodate Smith II if it is adjusted to recog-
nize a single additional exception, namely that coercion of
religious conduct prohibited by a generally applicable criminal
law is not subject to the clause at all. 2
In other words, the general rule under Model 1 is that
coercion of religious belief or conduct is a cognizable burden
triggering free exercise scrutiny, but the exception is that coer-
cion of religious conduct prohibited by a criminal statute is
not.
The difficulty with this model is that the Smith II excep-
tion almost swallows the general rule. Moreover, if the Smith II
exception is extended to government coercion authorized by a
generally applicable civil law, the exception really does swallow
the general rule, and Model 1, the traditional model, will no
longer accurately describe the realities of free exercise clause
law. This is because most cases involving government coercion
of religious conduct involve government action pursuant to
generally applicable criminal or noncriminal laws. In such a
situation, to say that strict scrutiny is still the general rule
would be downright misleading.'
3
11. This is the model described in Galloway, supra note 3.
12. See Galloway, supra note 3, at 871 ("Moreover, even in cases where the
government punishes a person for conduct required by religion, the burden does
not trigger free exercise scrutiny if the conduct is validly prohibited by statute.").
13. Model I would still be logically correct, but it would conceal rather than
reveal the realities of revised fmee exercise clause law.
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B. Model 2. A New Two-Track Model of Free Exercise Clause Law
A second approach is to recognize that strict scrutiny is no
longer the "general rule" for analyzing government coercion of
religious conduct. Instead, a two-track model would recognize
that government coercion of religious conduct may be subject
either to rationality review or strict scrutiny.
Several "switching questions" would determine whether
the analysis proceeds on track one (rationality review) or track
two (strict scrutiny). If the religiously motivated conduct is
prohibited by a generally applicable criminal or perhaps civil
law, rationality review would be used. Similarly, if the conduct
occurs in a prison or military context, rationality review would
apply. In contrast, strict scrutiny would apply if the govern-
ment coercion involves the denial of unemployment benefits
or perhaps other benefits involving individualized hearings,
singles out religious conduct for special burdens, or infringes
hybrid religious/fundamental rights. Given the scope of the
Smith II exception, the two-track model may be more accurate
than the traditional model, since strict scrutiny may now be
the "general rule" in name only.
C. Model 3. Rationality Review the General Rule; Strict Scrutiny
the Exception
If the Court does extend the Smith II "exception" to in-
clude government coercion of religious conduct where the
government action is authorized by a generally applicable civil
law,14 then it might.as well be frankly recognized that strict
scrutiny has become the exception rather than the general
rule. Since, in the vast majority of cases, government coercion
of religious conduct is imposed pursuant to generally applica-
ble criminal or civil law, rationality review will be the new gen-
eral rule.
The Supreme Court dropped a not very veiled hint that it
is heading in that direction when it said:
We have never invalidated any governmental action on the
basis of the Sherbeil test except the denial of unemploy-
14. Numerous recent lower court decisions have applied the Smith I excep-
tion to coercion of religious conduct authorized by generally applicable civil laws.
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ment compensation .... In recent years we have ab-
stained from applying the Sherbeft test (outside the unem-
ployment compensation field) at all .... Even if we were
inclined to breathe into Sherbeil some life beyond the un-
employment compensation field, we would not apply it to
require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal
law.15
This strongly suggests that the Court is planning to con-
fine strict scrutiny to cases involving denials of unemployment
compensation. 6 If that happens, it would indeed be a mock-
ery to say strict scrutiny is the general rule; the new general
rule would be rationality review.
This comment does not analyze which model of free exer-
cise clause analysis will ultimately prevail. Suffice it to say that
the future of the free exercise clause is up for grabs. However,
if the Rehnquist Court has decided to convert strict scrutiny
into a narrow exception and adopt a new general rule that gov-
ernment coercion of religious conduct is exempt from free
exercise scrutiny and subject only to substantive due process
rationality review, then we have indeed had a
counter-revolution in free exercise clause law.
15. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602-03 (1990). As stated
above, Sherbeit is the landmark case that adopted the strict scrutiny test as the
general rule in free exercise law.
16. As stated above, the Court would also continue to apply strict scrutiny to
government action that singles out religiously motivated conduct for special bur-
dens and in "hybrid situation[s]," where the government coercion of religious
conduct burdens an independent fundamental constitutional right. Id. at 1601-02.
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